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Lyapunov stochastic stability and control of
robust dynamic coalitional games with
transferable utilities
Dario Bauso, P. Viswanadha Reddy, Tamer Başar,
Abstract
This paper considers a dynamic game with transferable utilities (TU), where the characteristic
function is a continuous-time bounded mean ergodic process. A central planner interacts continuously
over time with the players by choosing the instantaneous alloc tions subject to budget constraints.
Before the game starts, the central planner knows the natureof the process (bounded mean ergodic),
the bounded set from which the coalitions’ values are sampled, and the long run average coalitions’
values. On the other hand, he has no knowledge of the underlying probability function generating
the coalitions’ values. Our goal is to find allocation rules that use a measure of the extra reward
that a coalition has received up to the current time by re-distributing the budget among the players.
The objective is two-fold: i) guaranteeing convergence of the average allocations to the core (or a
specific point in the core) of the average game, ii) driving the coalitions’ excesses to anpriori given
cone. The resulting allocation rules arerobust as they guarantee the aforementioned convergence
properties despite the uncertain and time-varying nature of the coaltions’ values. We highlight three
main contributions. First, we design an allocation rule based on full observation of the extra reward
so that the average allocation approaches a specific point inthe core of the average game, while
the coalitions’ excesses converge to ana priori given direction. Second, we design a new allocation
rule based on partial observation on the extra reward so thatthe average allocation converges to the
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core of the average game, while the coalitions’ excesses converge to ana priori given cone. And
third, we establish connections to approachability theory[9], [18] and attainability theory [4], [19].
Keywords Coalitional games with transferable utilities; allocation processes; approacha-
bility theory; Lyapunov stochastic stability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Coalitional games with transferable utilities (TU), introduced first by Von Neuman and
Morgenstern [25], have recently sparked much interest in the control and communication
engineering communities [21]. In essence, coalitional TU games are comprised of a set of
players who can form coalitions and a characteristic functio associating a real number with
every coalition. This real number represents the value of the coalition and can be thought of
as a monetary value that can be distributed among the membersof the coalition according to
some appropriate fairness allocation rule. The value of a coalition also reflects the monetary
benefit demanded by a coalition to be a part of the grand coalition.
This paper considers adynamic TU game, where the characteristic function is a bounded
mean ergodic process. Bounded means that the characteristifunction takes values in a convex
set according to an unknown probability distribution. Meanergodic means that the expected
value of the coalitions values at each time coincides with the long term average. With the
dynamic game we associate adynamic average gameobtained by averaging over time the
coalitions’ values, and assume that the core of the average gme is nonempty on the long run.
Given the above dynamic TU game, a central planner interactscontinuously over time with
the players by choosing the instantaneous allocations subject to budget constraints. Before
the game starts, the central planner knows the nature of the process (bounded mean ergodic),
the bounded set and the long run average coalitions’ values.On the other hand, he has no
knowledge of the underlying probability function generating the instantaneous coalitions’
values. Our goal is to find allocation rules that use a measureof the extra reward that a
coalition has received up to the current time by re-distribuing the budget among the players.
The objective is two-fold: i) guaranteeing convergence of the average allocations to the core
(or a specific point in the core) of the average game, ii) driving the coalitions’ excesses
to an a priori given cone. The resulting allocation rules arerobust as they guarantee the
aforementioned convergence properties despite the uncertain and time-varying nature of the
coaltions’ values.
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In the context of coalitional TU games,robustnessanddynamicsnaturally arise in all the
situations where the coalitions values are uncertain and time-varying, see e.g., [7]. Robustness
has to do with modeling coalitions’ values as unknown entities and this is in spirit with some
literature on stochastic coalitional games [23], [24]. However, we deviate from the latter works
since the probability function generating the random coaliti ns values is unknown, and this is
more in line with the concept of Unknown But Bounded (UBB) variables formalized in [8].
It is worth to mention that this formulation shares some common elements with the recent
literature on interval valued games [1], where the authors use intervals to describe coalitions
values quite similar to what is done in this paper. The interval nature of coalitions’ values
arises generally due to the optimistic and pessimistic expectations of the coalitions [11] when
cooperation is achieved from a strategic form game. We also note some differences in that
we focus here more on the time-varying nature of the coalitions’ values. In doing so, we also
link the approach to the set invariance theory [10] and stochastic stability theory [20] which
provides us somenice tools for stability analysis (see, e.g., the use of a Lyapunov function
in the proof of Theorem 4.1).
Bringing dynamical aspects into the framework of coalitional TU games is an element in
common with other papers [13], [16], [17]. The main differenc with those works is that
the values of coalitions are realized exogenously and no relation exists between consecutive
samples.
Convergence conditions together with the idea that allocati n rules use a measure of the
extra reward that a coalition has received up to the current time by re-distributing the budget
among the players are a main issue in a number of other papers [2], [12], [15], [18], [22] as
well. However, this paper departs from the aforementioned ones mainly in that dynamics in
those works is captured by a bargaining mechanism with fixed coalitions’ values while we
let the values be time-varying and uncertain. This last elemnt adds some robustness to our
allocation rule which has not been dealt with before.
The main contribution of this paper is captured by the following three results. First, we
design an allocation rule based on full observation of the extra reward so that the average
allocation approaches a specific point in the core of the average game, while the coalitions’
excesses converge to anpriori given direction. Second, we design a new allocation rule
based on partial observation on the extra reward so that the average allocation converges
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to the core of the average game, while the coalitions’ excesses converge to ana priori
given cone. Convergence of both allocation rules is proved via Lyapunov stochastic stability
theory. And third, we establish connections of the Lyapunovst chastic stability theory to the
approachability theory [9], [18] and attainability theory[4], [19].
A few other contributions of the paper are the definition of aver ge game, whose role
becomes fundamental when the coalitions’ values variations are known with delay by the
planner; the reformulation of the problem as a network flow control problem, where the
allocation rule turns into a robust control policy is a novelaspect, with the importance of
such a reformulation lying in the fact that we can prove the convergence of the allocations
using the strong tools of the Lyapunov stochastic stabilitytheory; and finally, the idea of
turning a coalitional TU game set up into a control theoreticproblem is a novel one, which
represents, by far, the main characteristics of this work.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we formulate the problem. In Section III,
we present the basic idea of our solution approach. In Section IV we state the three main
results of this work and postpone the derivation of such results to Section V. In Section VI,
we provide some numerical illustrations. Finally, in Section VII, we draw some concluding
remarks.
Notation. We view vectors as columns. For a vectorx, we usexi or [x]i to denote itsith
coordinate component. For two vectorsx and y, we usex < y (x ≤ y) to denotexi < yi
(xi ≤ yi) for all coordinate indicesi. We let xT denote the transpose of a vectorx, and
‖x‖n denote itsn-norm. For a matrixA, we useaij or [A]ij to denote itsijth entry. We use
|aij| to denote the absolute value of scalaraij . Given two setsU andS, we write U ⊂ S
to denote thatU is a proper subset ofS. We use|S| for the cardinality of a given finite
set S. Let Φ be a closed and convex set inRm, we useP (y) to denote the projection of
any pointy ∈ Rm onto Φ (closest point toy in Φ). We also denote by∂Φ the boundary of
Φ and ny the outward normal for any ∈ ∂Φ. We usedist(y,Φ) to denote the euclidean
distance between pointy and setΦ. Given a setN of players and a functionη : S 7→ R
defined for each nonempty coalitionS ⊆ N , we write< N, η > to denote the transferable
utility (TU) game with the players’ setN and the characteristic functionη. We let ηS be
the valueη(S) of the characteristic functionη associated with a nonempty coalitionS ⊆
N . Given a TU game< N, η >, we useC(η) to denote the core of the game,C(η) =
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{





i∈N xi = ηN ,
∑
i∈S xi ≥ ηS for all nonemptyS ⊂ N
}
. Also, R+ denotes the
set of nonnegative real numbers. Given a random vectorξ the notationE[ξ] denotes its
expected value. Given a random process{v(t)} we denote bỹv(t) =
∫ t
0
v(τ)dτ , its integral
and v̄(t) = ṽ(t)
t
its average up to timet.
II. M ODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we formulate the problem in its generic formand elaborate on the role of
information. LetN = {1, . . . , n} be a set of players andS ⊆ N the set of all (nonempty)
coalitions arising among these players. Denote bym = 2n − 1 the number of possible
coalitions. We assume that time is continuous and uset ∈ R+ to index the time slots.
We consider adynamic TU game, denoted< N, {v(t)} >, where{v(t)} is a continuous
flow of characteristic functions. The flow{v(t)} describes a bounded mean ergodic process.
By bounded we mean that given a bounded convex setV ∈ Rm and a probability function
P ∈ ∆(V), where∆(V) is the set of probability functions onV, then for all t ∈ R+ each
random variablev(t) takes values inV ∈ Rm according to probabilityP as expressed in (1);
by mean ergodic we mean that its expected value coincides with the long term average as in
(2):
v(t) ∈ V ⊂ Rm, for all t ∈ R+ (1)
E[v(t)] = limτ→∞v̄(τ), for all t ∈ R+. (2)
Thus, in the dynamic TU game< N, {v(t)} >, the players are involved in a sequence of
instantaneous TU games whereby, at each time, the instantaneous TU gameis < N, v(t) >
with v(t) ∈ V for all t ≥ 0. Further, we letvS(t) denotethe value assigned to a nonempty
coalition S ⊆ N in the instantaneous game< N, v(t) >.
With the dynamic game we associate adynamic average game< N, {v̄(t)} > and an
instantaneous average game at timet ≥ 0, < N, v̄(t) >.
The motivation of formalizing the above dynamic TU games is in that such games represent
a stylized model of all those scenarios where the coalitions’ values vary with time.
We assume that the core of the average game is nonempty on the long run. We will see
that without this assumption the problem under study has no solution. Thus, denote byvnom
the (long run) average coalitions’ values, namely,vnom := limt→∞ v̄(t) and letC(vnom) be
the core of the average game.
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Assumption 1:(balancedness) The core of the average game is nonempty in the limit:
C(vnom) 6= ∅.
We can view the above assumption as introducing some steady-st te (average) conditions on
a game scenario subject to instantaneous fluctuations. However, note that we do not make
assumptions regarding the balancedness of the instantaneous games which is the case with
[7]. Thus, the core of the instantaneous game can be empty at some timet.
Given the above dynamic TU game, a central planner interactscontinuously over time with
the players by choosing the instantaneous allocations denoted bya(t) ∈ Rn. We assume that
the allocations are subject to the following budget constraints.
Assumption 2:(bounded allocation) The instantaneous allocation is bounded within a
hyperbox inRn
a(t) ∈ A := {a ∈ Rn : amin ≤ a ≤ amax},
with a priori given lower and upper boundsamin, amax ∈ Rn.
As regards the information availablea priori (before the game starts) to the central planner,
we assume that he knows the nature of the process{v(t))} (bounded mean ergodic), the
bounded setV and the long run average coalitions’ valuesvnom. The latter is the same as
saying that he knows the expected coalitions’ values for allt ∈ R+. On the other hand, he
has no knowledge of the underlying probability functionP.
Assumption 3:(on available information) The planner knowsvnom.
Beside this, during the game the central planner also observe the extra reward of the
coalitions up tot and for all t ∈ R+. Given this, and in line with a number of other papers
[2], [12], [15], [18], [22], our goal is to find allocation rules that use a measure of the extra
reward that a coalition has received up to the current time byre-distributing the budget among
the players. To do this, a first step is to define excesses for the coalitions. For any coalition
S ⊆ N , we defineexcess (extra reward) at timet ≥ 0 as theexcess at timet = 0 plus the





ãi(t)− ṽS(t) + ǫS(0).
Furthermore, assuming without loss of generalityǫS(0) = 0, we say thatS is in excess at
time t ≥ 0 if the excess is nonnegative, i.e.,
∑
i∈S ãi(t) ≥ ṽS(t). Let ǫ(t) represent the vector
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of coalitions’ excesses, formally given as:
ǫ(t) = {ǫS(t)}N⊇S 6=∅ .
We are interested in answering two main questions for this cla s of games.
• Question 1: Are there allocation rules such that the average allocations converge? If
yes, let us denote byA0 the set where the average allocations converge to. Can we
make it converge to the core of the average gameA0 ⊆ C(vnom)? Can we guarantee the
convergence to a specific point of the core, call it nominal alloc tionanom, that we have
a priori selected?
• Question 2: Are there allocation rules such that the coalitions’ excesses ǫ(t) converge
to an a priori given coneΣ0, say for instance the nonnegativem-dimensional orthant
R
m
+ , or any directionαt for t ≥ 0 with fixed α ∈ R
m
+?
To motivate the above questions think of a situation where the objective of the central
planner is to maintain the stability of grand coalition in anverage sense, while controlling
the coalitions’ excesses at each timet ∈ R+.
We are now in the position of providing a formal and generic statement of the problem.
Henceforth, we use the symbol w.p.1 to mean “with probability one”.
Problem 2.1:Find an allocation rulef : Rm → A ∈ Rn, such that ifa(t) = f (ǫ(t)) then
i) limt→∞ ā(t) ∈ A0 ⊆ C(vnom) w.p.1, and ii)limt→∞ ǫ(t) ∈ Σ0 ⊆ Rm+ w.p.1.
Observe that because of the random nature of the coalitions’valuesv(t), both the excesses
ǫ(t) and the allocationsa(t) are random and as such we look at the convergence ofā(t) w.p.1.
Essentially, we require that the probability ofā(t) converging in the limit toA0 ⊆ C(vnom)
is 1. Similarly for ǫ(t) and Σ0. This type of convergence is also known aslmost sure
convergence [20].
We will show that if the planner has full observation ofǫ(t) at every timet then the above
problem is solvable even under the very strict condition ofA0 = anom andΣ0 = αt t ≥ 0
with fixed α. Conversely, if the planner has partial observation ofǫ(t) in that he only knows
the sign of each component ofǫ(t), then the problem is still solvable but under the relaxed
condition ofA0 = C(vnom) andΣ0 ⊆ Rm+ .
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A. Motivations
Dynamic coalitional games capture coordination in a numberof network flow applications.
Network flows model flow of goods, materials, or other resources between different produc-
tion/distribution sites [3]. We next provide a supply chainpplication that justifies the model
under study.
A single warehousev0 serves a number of retailersvi, i = 1, . . . , n, each one facing a
demanddi(t) unknown but bounded by pre-assigned valuesdmini ∈ R andd
max
i ∈ R at any
time periodt ≥ 0. After demanddi(t) has been realized, retailervi must choose to either
fulfill the demand or not. The retailers do not hold any private inventory and, therefore, if they
wish to fulfill their demands, they must reorder goods from the central warehouse. Retailers
benefit from joint reorders as they may share the total transportation costK (this cost could
also be time and/or players dependent). In particular, if retailer vi “plays” individually, the
cost of reordering coincides with the full transportation costK. Actually, when necessary a
single truck will serve only him and get back to the warehouse. This is illustrated by the
dashed cycles(v0,v8,v0), (v0,v9,v0), and(v0,v10,v0) in the network of Figure 1. The cost











(a) Five trucks (cycles) leavingv0 and serving coalitions












(b) One single truck (cycle) leavingv0 and serving coali-
tion {v1, . . . ,v10}.
Fig. 1. Example of a distribution network
If two or more retailers “play” in a coalition, they agree on ajoint decision (“everyone
reorders” or “no one reorders”). The cost of reordering for the coalition also equals the total
transportation cost that must be shared among the retailers. In this case, when necessary a
single truck will serve all retailers in the coalition and get back to the warehouse. This is il-
lustrated, with reference to coalition{v1, . . . ,v4} by the dashed cycle(v0,v4,v1,v2,v3,v0) in
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Figure 1(a). A similar comment applies to the coalition{v5,v6,v7} and the cycle(v0,v5,v6,v7,v0)
in Figure 1(a). The network topology in Figure 1(a) describes the existing coalitions. This
is clear if we look at the subgraph induced by the vertex-set{v1, . . . ,v10} (all vertices
exceptv0) and observe that such a subgraph has 5 connected components, i.e., {v1, . . . ,v4},
{v5, . . . ,v7}, {v8}, {v9}, and {v10} and that each component corresponds to an existing
coalition. The cost of not reordering is the sum of the unfulfilled demands of all retailers.
How the players will share the cost is a part of the solution geerated by the bargaining
process.
Conversely, the subgraph induced by{v1, . . . ,v10} in Figure 1(b) has a single connected
component which means that all retailers “play” in the grandcoalition and as such one single
truck (cycle) will leavev0 and serve all of them before returning tov0. This is represented
by the dashed cycle(v0,v4, . . . ,v10) in the same figure.
The cost scheme can be captured by a game with the setN = {v1, . . . ,vn} of players









Note that the bounds on the demanddi(t) reflect into the bounds on the cost as follows: for















To complete the derivation of the coalitions’ values we needto compute the cost savings
vS(t) of a coalitionS as the difference between the sum of the costs of the coalitions of the





Given the bound forcS(t) in (3), the valuevS(t) is also bounded, as given: for anyS ⊂ N












Thus, the cost savings (value) of each coalition is bounded uniformly by a maximum value.
Introducing time aspects into a static TU game opens the possibility for modeling aspects
such as intertemporal transfers, patience and expectations of players/coalitions. A generic
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dynamic coalitional game description should capture thesef atures. In a repeated joint replen-
ishment game as the one discussed above, allocation rules having the properties formalized
in Problem 2.1, encouragepatient retailers to “play” in the grand coalition, to coordinate
their replenishment policies and therefore to reduce totalransportation costs. We saypatient
retailers since condition i) in Problem 2.1 guarantees convergence to core on the long-run,
i.e., in an average sense. Condition ii) has the meaning of bounding the excesses during the
transient (before convergence occurs).
III. FLOW TRANSFORMATION BASED DYNAMICS
The basic idea of our solution approach is to recast the problem into a flow control one.
To do this, consider the hyper-graphH with vertex setV and edge setE as:
H := {V,E}, V = {v1, . . . ,vm}, E := {e1, . . . , en}.
Figure 2 depicts an example of hypergraph for a 3-player coaliti nal game. The vertex setV











Fig. 2. HypergraphH := {V, E} for a 3-player coalitional game.
generic edgei is incident to a vertexvj if the player i is in the coalition associated tovj .
So, incidence relations are described by matrixBHwhose rows are the characteristic vectors
cS ∈ Rn. We recall that the components of a characteristic vectorcSi = 1 if i ∈ S andc
S
i = 0
if i /∈ S. The flow control reformulation arises naturally if we view allocation ai(t) as the
flow on edgeei and the coalition valuevS(t) of a generic coalitionS as the demand in the
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corresponding vertexvj . In view of this, allocation in the core translates into over-satisfying
the demand at the vertices. Specifically,
a(t) ∈ C(v(t)) ⇔ BHa(t) ≥ v(t), (4)
with the last inequality satisfied with the equal sign due to the efficiency condition of the
core, i.e,
∑
i=1 ai(t) = vm(t), wherevm(t) denotes themth component ofv(t) and is equal
to the grand coalition valuevN(t). Now, sincev(t) is unobservable by the planner at timet,
we need to introduce some allocation error dynamics which accounts for the derivatives of
the excesses. Sinceǫ(t) represents the coalition excess, we have:
ǫ̇(t) = BHa(t)− v(t), v(t) ∈ V. (5)
Note that the above differential equation admits a solutionat least in the sense of Filippov
[14]. From (4) and by averaging and taking the limit in (5), wecan reformulate Problem 2.1




the target setT , defined below, w.p.1 (see, e.g., Fig. 3):
T := {τ ∈ Rm : τm = 0, τj ≥ 0, ∀j = 1, . . . , m− 1}.





Fig. 3. Trajectory forǫ(t)−ǫ(0)
t
.
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Remark 3.1:Driving the average allocations to a particular pointanom ∈ A0 ⊆ C(vnom) re-
sults in reaching a specific point in the target setT . To see this, note that whenlimt→∞ ā(t) =




is driven to the pointBHanom − vnom ∈ T .
The inequality condition in (4) is transformed into equality type by introducing, from standard
LP techniques,m−1 surplus variables (one per each coalition other than the grand coalition).
This increases the dimension of the control space of the planner fromm to n +m − 1 and
the dynamics (5) can be rewritten as follows:










 ∈ Rm×n+m−1. Variablex(t) represents the state of the system
and captures deviation from the balanced system, i.e., the syst m characterized byanom and
vnom. We introduce the set of feasible controls as:
U :=
{
u(t) ∈ Rn+m−1 : u(t) = [aT (t) sT (t)]T , a(t) ∈ A, s(t) ≥ 0
}
. (7)
Toward the reformulation of the problem as a stochastic stabiliz ility one, we introduce the
following preliminary result.
Lemma 3.1:If the variablex(t) is asymptotically stable almost surely, i.e., (8) holds true,
then the average allocations converge to the core of the average game w.p.1. as expressed by
(9), and the excesses converge to the coneRm+ w.p.1. as described in (10):
lim
t→∞
x(t) = 0, w.p.1. (8)
lim
t→∞
ā(t) ∈ C(vnom), w.p.1 (9)
lim
t→∞
ǫ(t) ∈ Rm+ , w.p.1. (10)




0 w.p.1. and therefore, by integrating and dividing byt in (6) alsolimt→∞Bū(t)− v̄(t) = 0
w.p.1. The latter can be rewritten aslimt→∞ Bū(t) = vnom w.p.1, and as from (7)̄s(t) =
BHā(t)−v̄(t) ≥ 0 andvnom is balanced by Assumption 2 then we conclude thatlimt→∞ ā(t) ∈
C(vnom) w.p.1.
To see why (8) implies (10), observe that iflimt→∞ x(t) = 0 w.p.1., from (7) and under
the assumptionx(0) = ǫ(0) = 0, then limt→∞ ǫ(t) = limt→∞ s̃(t) ≥ 0 and (10) is proved.
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It is worth noting that condition (9) is part of Problem 2.1. In other words when solving
Problem 2.1 we always guarantee (9). If this is clear then, wecan use the above lemma to
rephrase Problem 2.1. In doing this we need to make a partial distinction between cases i)
and ii). More specifically, case ii) whereA0 = C(vnom) can be restated as follows:
Find u(t) := φ(x(t)) ∈ U such that lim
t→∞
x(t) = 0 w.p.1. (11)
Note that if we wish to reach a specific pointanom then the condition (9) is only necessary
and the resulting problem is a stricter version of (11).
IV. M AIN RESULTS
In this section we present the three main results of this work. The first one relates to the
case where the planner has full observation onx(t) in which case the average allocation
can be driven to a specific point in the Core of the average game. The second result applies
to the case where the planner has partial observation onx(t), and convergence to the Core
can still be guaranteed but not to a specific point of the Core.The third result highlights
connections of the implemented solution approach to the appro chability principle [9], [18]
and attainability principle [4], [19].
A. Full information case
In this section, we solve Problem 2.1 withA0 = anom andΣ0 = αt, t ≥ 0 with fixed α
under the assumption that the planner has full observation of the excessesǫ(t) and therefore
x(t) as well. We recall that inferringx(t) from ǫ(t) is possible as the surpluss(t) is selected
by the planner. As we have said before, the problem that we solve is a stricter version of (11).
This version derives from augmenting the state of dynamics (6) as explained in the rest of this
section. Before introducing the augmentation technique let us assume that the fluctuations of
the coalitions’ values around the meanvnom are independent of the statex(t). We formalize
this in the next assumption where we denote by∆v(t) = v(t)− vnom the above fluctuations.
Assumption 4:The statex(t) and the coalitions’ values fluctuations∆v(t) are independent.
Introducing the fluctuations∆v(t) allows us to rewrite dynamics (6) in a more convenient
way. To do this, note first that, asu(t) = [a(t)T s(t)T ]T and fromBunom = vnom, if anom
is fixed thensnom ∈ R
m−1





T are fixed. Let us denote
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∆u(t) = u(t)− unom. Dynamics (6) can be rewritten as follows:
ẋ(t) = Bu(t)− v(t) = Bu(t)− (vnom + (v(t)− vnom)) = Bu(t)− vnom −∆v(t)
= B (u(t)− unom)−∆v(t) = B∆u(t)−∆v(t)
We mentioned before that we will focus on a stricter version of (11). We do this by augmenting
the state as shown next. First, denote byB† a generic pseudo inverse matrix ofB and complete





















Here we assume thatv(t) is independent ofy(t) as well. After integrating the above system























It turns out that to drivex(t) to zero w.p.1, and obtainunom as average allocation on the
long run, we can rely on a simple function̂φ(.), which depends onz(t). Before introducing

































Let ∆umin and ∆umax be the minimal and maximal values of∆u(t) for the following
constraints to hold true:u(t) = unom + ∆u(t) ∈ U . Then, let us formally definêφ(z(t))

















Fig. 4. Dynamical System
as:
φ̂(z(t)) := unom +∆u(t) ∈ U, ∆u(t) = sat[∆umin, ∆umax](−z(t)), (16)
where with sat[a,b](ξ) we denote the saturated function that, given a generic vector ξ and







bi for all i ξi > bi
ai for all i ξi < ai
ξi for all i ai ≤ ξi ≤ bi
.
Now, taking the controlu(t) = φ̂(z(t)), we obtain the dynamic systeṁz(t) = Bφ̂(z(t))−v(t)
as displayed in Fig. 4. With the above preamble in mind, we areready to state the following
convergence property.
Theorem 4.1:Using the controller̂φ(z(t)), as in (16), we havelimt→∞ z(t) = 0 w.p.1 and
thereforelimt→∞ ū(t) = unom.
In the next corollary, we use the previous result to provide an answer to Problem 2.1.
Corollary 4.1: The statex(t) is driven to zero w.p.1 as expressed in (11), the average
allocation converges to the nominal allocation i.e.,limt→∞ ā(t) = anom, w.p.1 and the excesses
converge to the directionΣ0 = αt with α = snom, i.e., limt→∞ ǫ(t) ∈ Σ0.
Proof: This is a direct consequence of the result proved in the previous theorem. From
(14), and[B† F ] being a non singular matrix, we havelimt→∞ x(t) = 0 w.p.1. From the
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previous theorem we also havelimt→∞ ū(t) = unom. Sinceu(t) = [aT (t) sT (t)]T , we have
that limt→∞ ā(t) = anom and limt→∞ ǫ(t) = s̃(t) = snomt.
To summarize, in the full information case, the controlleru(t) defined by (16) induces an
allocation sequencea(t) such that the averagēa(t) converges toA0 = anom and the excesses
approachsnomt.
B. Partial information case
In the previous section we observed that if the planner has full observation of the excesses
and therefore ofx(t) then he can design an allocation rule so that the average allocations
are driven toanom and the excesses approachsnomt. In this section, we solve Problem 2.1
with A0 = C(vnom) and under the assumption that the planner has partial observation of
x(t). In particular, we assume that the planner observes the signof x(t) for all t ∈ R+. An
information structure based on the sign ofx(t) has an oracle-based interpretation which we
discuss in detail in Subsection IV-B1.
Similarly to the previous section, suppose that we know a particular allocationanom in
the coreC(vnom), and let us study the convergence properties of the average allocations.
In particular, using an allocation ruleu(t) = φ(x(t)), we require thatx(t) satisfying the
dynamicsẋ(t) = Bφ(x(t)) − v(t), converge to zero in probability. In this section, we state
the second main result of this work which provides a solutionProblem 2.1 with partial
information structure. To do this, let us denote again byB† a generic pseudo inverse matrix
of B and take a feasible allocationunom such that
Bunom = vnom := lim
t→∞
v̄(t), unom ∈ U.
Also, for future purposes, define a function̂φ(.), which depends only on the sign ofx(t), as
follows:
φ̂(sgn(x(t))) := unom +∆u(t) ∈ U, ∆u(t) = −δB
†sgn(x(t)). (17)
Now, taking the controlu(t) = φ̂(sgn(x(t))), we obtain the dynamic systeṁx(t) = Bφ̂(sgn(x(t)))−
v(t) as displayed in Fig. 5. Now, we state the following convergence property.
Theorem 4.2:Using the controlleru(t) = φ̂(sgn(x(t))) as in (17) we havelimt→∞ x(t) = 0
w.p.1.
Corollary 4.2: The average allocation converges to the core of the average gm as in (9)
and the excessesǫ(t) converge toRm+ as in (10).







Fig. 5. Dynamical System
Proof: Direct consequence of Theorem 4.2 and Lemma 3.1.
1) Oracle-based interpretation:In this subsection we elaborate more on the partial infor-
mation structure. In particular, we highlight how the feedback on statex(t) can be reviewed
as the result of an oracle-based procedure. To see this, assume that the planner knows the
sign of x(t). Sincex(t) = (ǫ(t)− s̃(t)) − (ǫ(0)− x(0)), sgn(x(t)) reflects over-satisfaction
of coalitions with respect to the threshold̃s(t). In particular, take without loss of generality







1 ǫj(t) > s̃j(t)
0 ǫj(t) = s̃j(t)
−1 ǫj(t) < s̃j(t).
(18)
To summarize, we can think of a situation where the planner app oaches an oracle that tells
him the sign ofx(t). Sinces(t) is chosen by the planner for everyt, the accumulated surplus,
s̃(t), is given as an input to the oracle. The oracle returns “yes” if the actual excess is greater
thans̃(t) and “no” otherwise. The use of an oracle is an element in common with the ellipsoid
method in optimization and with a large literature [26] on cutting planes.
Recall that nonnegativeness of the threshold has its roots in the feasibility conditionu(t) ∈
U for all t ≥ 0 with feasible setU as in (7).
Nonnegativeness of the threshold provides us with a furthercomment on the information
available to the planner. Actually, from the first conditionin (18), we can conclude that
coalitions associated to a positive statex(t) are certainly in excess. This is clear if we observe
that sgn (xj(t)) = 1 implies ǫj(t) > s̃j(t) ≥ 0. We can then summarize the information
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1 then coalitionS in excess
−1, 0 nothing can be said.
Trivially, the development in the full information case in Section IV-A, which is all based
on control strategy (16), fits the case wherex(t) is revealed completely. In this last case, the
fact that the planner knowsx(t) implies that he knowsǫ(t) as well. Also, it is intuitive to
infer that in this last set up, exact knowledge ofx(t) can only influence positively the planner
in terms of speed of convergence of allocations to the core ofthe average game.
Remark 4.1:As the planner knows a priori the nominal game and a corresponding nominal
allocation vector, a natural question that arises is why onehas to design an allocation rule
as given by (16) and (17) instead of a stationary ruleφ̂(.) = unom. The rules given by (16)
and (17) intuitively translate to meeting the demands of coaliti ns in an average sense. This
feature reflects patience aspect of coalitions in a dynamic setting, i.e., even if a demand is
not met instantaneously a coalition is willing to wait and stay in the grand coalition as the
demand is fulfilled in an average sense.
C. Connections to Approachability and Attainability
1) Approachability: Approachability theory was developed by Blackwell in 1956 [9] and
is captured in the well known Blackwell’s Theorem. Along thelines of Section 3.2 in [18],
we recall next the geometric (approachability) principle that lies behind Blackwell’s Theorem.
The goal of this section is to show that such a geometric principle shares striking similarities
with the solution approach used in the previous sections.
To introduce the approachability principle, letΦ be a closed and convex set inRm and let
P (y) be the projection of any pointy ∈ Rm (closest point toy in Φ). Also denote bȳyk the





and letdist(ȳk,Φ) be the euclidean distance between
point ȳk and setΦ.
Lemma 4.1:(Approachability principle [18]) Suppose that a sequence of uniformly bounded
vectorsyk in Rm satisfies condition (19),
[ȳk − P (ȳk)]
T [yk+1 − P (ȳk)] ≤ 0, (19)
then limk→∞ dist(ȳk,Φ) = 0.
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Now, to make use of the above principle in our set up, let us consider the discrete time
analog of the excess dynamics (6):
xk+1 = xk +B∆uk −∆vk,
and define a new variableyk = xk − xk−1 so that we can look at the sequence ofyk in Rm.
Likewise, consider the discrete time version of control (17) as displayed below:
φ̂(sgn(xk)) := unom +∆uk ∈ U, ∆uk = −δB
†sgn(xk − x0). (20)
We are now in a position to state the main result of this section.
Theorem 4.3:Using the controlleruk = φ̂(sgn(xk − x0)) as in (20) we have that
i) the vector0 is approachable by the sequenceȳk,
lim
k→∞
ȳk = 0, w.p.1, (21)
and therefore
ii) the average allocations converge to the core of the average game,
lim
k→∞
āk ∈ C(vnom), w.p.1. (22)
The strength of the above result is in that it sheds light on how the convergence problem
dealt with in this work has a stochastic stability interpretation as well as an approachability
one.
Remark 4.2:(Continuous-time approachability) We can reformulate Theorem 4.3 in the
continuous time. To see this, let us first definey(t) := ẋ(t). Next we need to derive the
continuous time version of (19). To this aim, lett → r(t) be a differentiable continuous time
variable and letz(t) = r(t)−r(0)
t




rk andzk+1 = 1k+1rk+1. The approachability principle is given as
[zk − P (zk)]
T [φ− P (zk)] ≤ 0
whereφ = (k + 1)zk+1 − kzk. In continuous time the above condition translates to
[z(t)− P (z(t))]T [φ− P (z(t))] ≤ 0





+ z(t+∆t). Further, as∆t → 0 we havelim∆t→0
φ
∆t
= tż(t)+ z(t) = ṙ(t).
The approachability principle in continuous time can then breproposed as
[z(t)− P (z(t))]T [ṙ(t)− P (z(t))] ≤ 0, (23)
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which constitutes the continuous time version of (19). IfΦ = {0} we haveP (z(t)) = 0
and zT (t)ṙ(t) ≤ 0. Now, takingr(t) = x(t) we see thatz(t) is the average ofy(t). Then




= 0 and therefore from Lemma 3.1 we arrive at (9) which represents the
continuous time version of (22).
2) Attainability: Attainability is a new notion developed in [4], [19] in the context of
2-player continuous-time repeated games with vector payoffs. Attainability finds its roots in
transportation networks, distribution networks, production networks applications. The main
question is the following one: “Under what conditions a strategy for player 1 exists such that
the cumulative payoff converges (in the lim sup sense) to a pre-assigned set (in the space of
vector payoffs) independently of the strategy used by player 2”.
Attainability shares similarities with two main notions inrobust control theory [10]. The first
notion is calledrobust global attractivenessand refers to the property of a set to “attract”
the state of the system under a proper control strategy and independently of the effects
of the disturbance. The second notion is referred to asrobustly controlled invarianceand
describes the property of a set to bound the state trajectoryunder a proper control strategy
and independently of the effects of the disturbance. Both notio s are used in the following
formalization of the attainability principle. The principle is accompanied by a sketch of the
proof but no formal proof is reported as attainability is themain focus of another paper
and here it is just auxiliary to the solution of our main problem and also because the
aforementioned two notions are well known in robust controltheory. We refer the readers to
[10] and [4], [19] for further details.
Let Φ be a closed and convex set inRm and consider a differentiable continuous-time
variablet 7→ y(t) taking value inRm for all t ≥ 0.
Lemma 4.2:(Attainability principle [4], [19]) Suppose that the differentiable continuous-
time variablet 7→ y(t) satisfies conditions (24)-(25),
[y(t)− P (y(t))]T [ẏ(t)− P (y(t))] < 0, y(t) 6∈ Φ (24)
nTy(t) [ẏ(t)− P (y(t))] ≤ 0, y(t) ∈ ∂Φ, (25)
then limt→∞ dist(y(t),Φ) = 0.
Essentially, condition (25) is strictly related to thesubtangentiality conditionsas formulated
by Nagumo in 1942 and surveyed in [10]. Such conditions are proven to characterize robustly
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controlled invariant sets. We provide a geometric perspectiv on such a condition in Fig. 7(b).
Consider a 2 player continuous-time repeated game and lety(t) be the cumulative payoff up
to time t. Denote byY the set of possible instantaneous vector payoffs, call themẏ(t), for a
fixed strategy of player 1 and for varying strategy of player 2. Condition (25) is equivalent
to Y ⊂ H− := {y ∈ Rm|ny(t)ẏ(t) ≤ 0} and guarantees that the cumulative payoff up to time
t+ dt (dt is the infinitesimal time interval)y(t+ dt) does not quitΦ.
As regards condition (24), suppose without loss of generality thatΦ := {x ∈ Rm| V (x) ≤
κ̂} for a fixed scalarκ. Condition (24) establishes that the setΦ = {x ∈ Rm| V (x) ≤ κ̂}
for any scalar̂κ satisfyingκ̂ > κ is a contractive set. By contractive set we mean that it is
invariant and, whenever the state is on the boundary, the control can “push it towards the
interior”. This is illustrated in Fig. 7(a). LetY and y(t) have the same meaning as before.
Condition (24) establishes thatY ⊂ H− := {y ∈ Rm| [y(t) − P (y(t))]T ẏ(t) < 0} which


















(b) Robust control invariance: condition (25).
Fig. 6. Geometric representation of conditions (24) and (25).
Based on the above lemma, we can rephrase Theorem 4.2 as follows.
Theorem 4.4:Using the controlleru(t) = φ̂(sgn(x(t))) as in (17) we have that the vector
0 is attainable byx(t).
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V. DERIVATION OF THE MAIN RESULTS
A. Proof of Theorem 4.1
This proof is derived in the context of Lyapunov stochastic sability theory [20]. We start
by observing that usingu(t) = φ̂(z(t)) we have:
ż(t) = Bφ̂(z(t))− v(t). (26)
Consider a candidate Lyapunov functionV (z(t)) = 1
2
zT (t)z(t). The idea is to show that
E[V̇ (z(t))] < 0 1 for all t ≥ 0. Actually, the theory establishes that if the last condition holds
true, thenV (z(t)) is a supermartingale and therefore by the martingale convergence theorem
limt→∞ V (z(t)) = 0 w.p.1 (almost surely). To see thatE[V̇ (z(t))] < 0 is true, observe that
from (15) we have
E[V̇ (z(t))] = E[zT (t)ż(t)]
= E[zT (t)∆u(t)]− E[zT (t)B†∆v(t)]
= E[zT (t)sat(−z(t))] < 0,
where conditionE[zT (t)B†∆v(t)] = 0 is a direct consequence2 of the assumption that∆v(t)
is independent ofx(t) and y(t). But the above condition implies thatlimt→∞ V (z(t)) = 0
w.p.1 and therefore alsolimt→∞ z(t) = 0 w.p.1. So far we have proved the first part of the
statement, i.e., that the dynamic system (26) converges to zer w.p.1. For the second part,
































= unom as claimed in
the statement.
1Stochastic stability involves time derivative of the expectation of V (x(t)). However, sinceV (.) is non-negative and
smooth, the limit and expectation can be interchanged by using the dominated convergence theorem [27].
2If ∆v(t) is independent ofx(t) andy(t) thenC∆v(t) is independent ofz(t) = Ax(t) +By(t).
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B. Proof of Theorem 4.2
Consider a candidate Lyapunov functionV (x(t)) = 1
2
xT (t)x(t). The idea is to show that
E[V̇ (x(t))] < 0 for all t ≥ 0. For this to be true, it must be
E[V̇ (x(t))] = E[xT (t)ẋ(t)]
= E[xT (t)Bu(t)]− E[xT (t)v(t)]
= E[xT (t)Bunom] + E[x




= E[xT (t)B∆u(t)] < 0.
where conditionE[xT (t)∆v(t)] = 0 is a direct consequence of Assumption 4. But the above
conditionE[xT (t)B∆u(t)] < 0 is satisfied sinceB∆u(t) = −δsgn(x), which in turn implies
E[xT (t)B∆u(t)] = E[−δ‖x(t)‖1] < 0.
Then we obtain thatlimt→∞ V (x(t)) = 0 w.p.1 and therefore alsolimt→∞ x(t) = 0 w.p.1 and
this concludes the proof.
C. Proof of Theorem 4.3
We first prove that (21) implies (22). Invoking the discrete time reformulation of Lemma 3.1,
we can infer thatlimk→∞
xk−x0
k




then we can conclude thatlimk→∞ ȳk = 0 w.p.1 implies limk→∞ āk ∈
C(vnom), w.p.1.
We now prove that using the controlleruk = φ̂(sgn(xk)) as in (20) then (21) holds true. To
see this, let us invoke the approachability principle in Lemma 4.1 and observe that a sufficient
condition for approachability of̄yk to 0 is ȳTk yk+1 ≤ 0 for all k. This is evident if we take set
Φ including only the zero vector,Φ = {0}, and thusP (ȳk) = 0 in (19). For the present case,




T (xk+1 − xk) ≤ 0,
which implies(xk −x0)TB∆uk − (xk −x0)T∆vk ≤ 0 for all k. Taking the expectation, from
Assumption 4 we know thatE[(xk − x0)T∆vk] = 0 and so we can write
E[(xk − x0)
TB∆uk − (xk − x0)
T∆vk] = E[(xk − x0)
TB∆uk]
= E[(xk − x0)
TB(−δB†sgn(xk − x0))] ≤ 0.
From the above condition we derive thatȳTk yk+1 ≤ 0 w.p.1 for all k and this concludes our
proof.
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D. Proof of Theorem 4.4
Let us invoke the attainability principle in Lemma 4.2 and observe that a sufficient condition
for x(t) to attain0 w.p.1 is that
E[xT (t)ẋ(t)] < 0, x(t) 6= 0 (27)
E[ẋ(t)] = 0, x(t) = 0. (28)
This is evident if we take setΦ including only the zero vector,Φ = {0}, and thusP (x(t)) = 0
in (24) and (25). Now, observe that condition (27) is equivalent to conditionE[V̇ ] < 0 used
in the proof of Theorem 4.2. Condition (28) is also satisfied as sgn(0) = 0 and this concludes
our proof.
VI. NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATIONS
Consider a3 player coalitional TU game, som = 7, with values of coalitions in the
following intervals:
v({1}) ∈ [0, 4], v({2}) ∈ [0, 4], v({3}) ∈ [0, 4],
v({1, 2}) ∈ [0, 4], v({1, 3}) ∈ [0, 6],
v({2, 3}) ∈ [0, 7], v({1, 2, 3}) ∈ [0, 12].
The convex setV is then a hyperbox characterized by the above intervals. From Assumption
3, the planner knows the long run average game, i.e.,l mt→∞ v̄(t) = vnom. Without loss of
generality we take the balanced nominal game be asvnom = [1 2 3 4 5 6 10]T . In other words,
during the simulations we randomize the instantaneous games v(t) ∈ V so that it satisfies the







v(τ)dτ = vnom. (29)
Next, we describe an algorithm to generateP ∈ ∆(V) and thereforev(t) ∈ V such that the
above condition holds true.
By construction,vnom is in the relative interior of the convex hull generated by the columns
of the matrixR. If an instance of the gamev(t) is chosen asri with probabilitypi from the pair
(R, p), Assumption 3 is satisfied. For simulations we ran the algorithm10 times to generate10
(R, p) pairs inV. Further, from each pair(R, p) we take100, 000 random selections (using
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Algorithm
Input: SetV and valuevnom.
Output: Probability functionP ∈ ∆(V) to generatev(t) ∈ V.
1 : Initialize Generatem random points,ri ∈ V ⊂ Rm, i =
1, 2, · · · , m,
2 : SolveR.p = vnom, with R = [r1, r2, · · · rm],
3 : If p ≥ 0 and1Tp > 0, then go to (4) else go to (1),





R andp asp = p
(1T p)
,
5 : If ri ∈ V, i = 1, 2, · · · , m, then go to (6) else go to (1).
6 : STOP
Matlab randsrc function) to realizev(t). The step size is set to∆ = 0.05. The results
are averaged over the10 pairs. The nominal choice of allocations and surplus is taken as
unom = [2.5 3 4.5 1.5 1 1.5 1.5 2 1.5]
T . It can be verified thatBunom = vnom.
Full information case: The saturation thresholds∆umin and ∆umax are chosen so as to
ensureu(t) ∈ U . This condition translates intoUmin ≤ unom + sat[∆umin, ∆umax] ≤ Umax.
Denote1 as a vector with all entries equal to 1. For the instantaneousgame a negative
allocation/surplus is not allowed, soUmin ≥ 0 · 1. Further, an allocation/surplus greater than
the value of grand coalition is not allowed, soUmax ≤ vnom(N) · 1. For the given game
parameters, we see that the lower and upper thresholds for the saturation function are−1
and 5.5, respectively. Next, we present the performance results ofthe robust control law




converges to zero. Fig. 7(a) illustrates this behavior for the first
component of coalition{1, 2}. Further, by Corollary 4.1, the same control law ensures that
the average allocations converge to the nominal allocations n the long run, in other words
limt→∞ ā(t) = anom and Fig. 7(b) illustrates this behavior.
Partial information case: The choice ofδ is crucial so as to ensureu(t) ∈ U . This condition
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(b) Plot of limt→∞ ā(t)− anom
Fig. 7. Performance of the control law given by (16).






















ij|} = 2.11. For the instantaneous game a negative
allocation/surplus is not allowed, soUmin ≥ 0.1. Furthermore, an allocation/surplus greater
than the value of grand coalition is not allowed, soUmax ≤ vnom(N).1. We choseδ = 1,
which satisfies the above stated requirements. Next, we present performance results of the



























































(b) Plot of limt→∞ ā(t)− anom
Fig. 8. Performance of the control law given by (17).
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robust control law given by equation (17). From Theorem 4.2,x(t) converges to zero in




to zero. Fig. 8(a) illustrates this behavior for the first component of coalition{1, 2}. Further,
by Corollary 4.2, the same control law ensures that the average allocations converge to the
core C(vnom) and from equation (17) it is clear that the instantaneous alloc tions lie in a
neighborhood of nominal allocations. As a result there is uncertainty in the convergence of
average allocations towards nominal allocations on the long ru and Fig. 8(b) illustrates this
behavior.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we studied dynamic cooperative games where at each instant of time the
value of each coalition of players is unknown but varies within a bounded polyhedron.
With the assumption that the average value of each coalitionin the long run is known with
certainty, we presented robust allocations schemes, whichconverge to the core, under two
informational settings. We proved the convergence of both alloc tion rules using Lyapunov
stochastic stability theory. Furthermore, we establishedconnections of Lyapunov stability
theory to concepts of approachability and attainability. The control laws or allocation schemes
are derived on the premise that the GD knows a priori, the nomial allocation vector. If this
information is not available then the problem can be treatedas a learning process where
the GD is trying to learn the (balanced) nominal game from theinstantaneous games. The
allocation rules designed in this paper assure stability ofthe coalitions in average, and as a
result capture patience and expectations of the players in an integral sense. The modeling
aspects of generic dynamic coalitional games are open questions at this point of time.
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